United States and Russian Intelligence

A Secret Game of Information Warfare After WWII

© Jessica Sprunt

May 29, 2009
Harry Truman and Joseph Stalin,  Library of Congress: cph 3a14367
These two nations partook in a tug of war for top intelligence domination during a time of uncertainly, secrecy and paranoia.

There were many challenges facing intelligence collection agencies. Instead of both sides cooperating, the United States and Russia took defensive measures against one another through denials and deception. Neither wanted to give up certain information that they did not want the other having or knowing.

The Game of Nations

Intelligence gathering or spying is a pastime that is indulged by virtually every nation. Some even refer to it as “The Game of Nations”. One of the reasons it is considered a game is because there are rules. Some are written, like international conventions covering diplomacy. Others are unwritten, such as an exchange of captured personnel. Both “teams” have a similar objective of penetrating their opponent’s intelligence apparatuses. This is achieved through coded signal deciphering, double agents, covert surveillance and sophisticated communication equipment. However, the most difficult part of the game is keeping score. Intelligence is not rated on a scale of fail or pass.

One of the ways to determine who is ahead would be to review the success of the agency over all. Triumph over your opponent can be calculated in many ways. When referring to an intelligence agency there are three main criteria. The first is the integrity of service. This can include insider opinions, receipt of defectors and the ability to run successful cases. In addition, counter-intelligence plays a role. An agencies ability to spot false defectors, catch spies and deter treachery all play into their level of integrity.

The second criterion is operational prowess. This covers things such as treatment of defectors, planting of moles, managing double agents and resourceful infiltrations. An intelligence organization must also have tactical capability. This includes training facilities, as well as, communication technology, deployment of tactical agents and co-operation of honourable correspondence. Lastly, product exploitation, such as timely dissemination, reputation as a reliable source and the overall role in development of intelligence assessments all determine a true victory of an operational agency. In a game there is a winner and a loser. However, “The Game of Nations” was not always played to win, sometimes the end result is simply more knowledge.

Concealment and Mistrust

The CIA and FBI had been able to develop a broad understanding of the inner workings of Soviet intelligence specifically, the NKVD, it successors, MVD-MGD and the KGB. However, they had no first hand knowledge of how the overseas operations were conducted. This changed when Captain Khokhlov surrender to his intended victim, Georgi S. Okolovich, the leader of the Frankfurt based NTS Émigré group. Instead of following out his orders, he volunteered to tell everything he knew about the First Chief Directorate. In addition, he turned in two fellow assassins who had been trained in Moscow by the KGB. However, the picture he painted was not one that pleased the CIA. He claimed the First Chief Directorate was a huge structure, employing several thousands of intelligence gathering persons collecting information about useful targets in the West.

Although many nations are involved in some type of intelligence gathering, there are only a few key players at the top of the game. The United States of America is one of them. This country is powerful, but at the same time fears the unknown. The cloak of secrecy they faced from Russia only added fuel to the fire and encouraged the CIA to further its efforts to find out the Soviets secrets.

Source:

West, Nigel. Games of Intelligence. (Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London). 1989.


The copyright of the article United States and Russian Intelligence in American History is owned by Jessica Sprunt. Permission to republish United States and Russian Intelligence in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.


Harry Truman and Joseph Stalin,  Library of Congress: cph 3a14367
       


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